PHARMACOGENOMICS VERSUS PHARMACOGENETICS
Pharmacogenomics is related to, yet distinct from pharmacogenetics, a discipline that started in the 1950s to study inherited differences in drug absorption, metabolism and elimination. 1 Since its inception pharmacogenetics has been necessarily limited by the available technology to circumscribed, 'keyhole' views of an individual's genetic makeup. Inherited variations in drug metabolism are usually monogenic. For example, one out of every 300 patients is homozygous for loss-of-function alleles of thiopurine methyl-transferase (TPMT) and will develop acute myelosuppression in response to azathioprine treatment. 2 Such observations, when validated for routine clinical use, are a natural extension of current clinical protocols. These data fit seamlessly into existing medical records and can be protected within the existing framework of ensuring confidentiality of medical records.
By contrast, pharmacogenomics proposes to study the entire spectrum of genes involved in determining response to a medication. Pharmacogenomics expands the scope of pharmacogenetics by using information from the Human Genome Project and novel techniques such as functional genomics and high throughput screening. 3 It ambitiously aims to span pharmacokinetics, toxicology and pharmacodynamics by including variations in intracellular regulatory mechanisms in order to extract a 'genomic fingerprint' which can be used for predictive drug response testing. The sheer magnitude of information resulting from pharmacogenomic analyses coupled with emerging bioinformatics solutions may yield a qualitative, disruptive change when compared to previous attempts to match drugs to genotypic variations. Even before its optimistic expectations materialize, however, pharmacogenomics is poised to challenge our current understanding of privacy.
THE CHALLENGE OF STORED DNA AND GENOMIC DATABASES
Studies to define practically relevant pharmacogenomic predictive patterns will require robust single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) and haplotype analyses in thousands of participants in large-scale clinical trials. 4, 5 These studies will create large databases of genomic profiles. Stored DNA samples or digitized sequence information will contain the individual's probabilistic 'future diary', 6 and as such are more vulnerable to violations of privacy than, for example learning about a person's dosage requirements of azathioprine for the treatment of leukemia. Therefore, strengthening the individual's control over his DNA could help to diminish the risk to privacy. For example, informed consent should clarify if the sample will be destroyed or stored after the test covered by the consent has been performed. 7 The consent should be limited to the specific use of DNA as proposed in the research protocol, and the patients should have the right to withdraw the DNA samples from the research project. 8 Alternatively, consent can be sought to store samples for future testing, as discussed by a multidisciplinary consent group at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 9 In the case of stored samples, the Swedish Medical Research Council guidelines request a separate informed consent for each new genetic analysis, with narrowly defined exceptions. 10 Safeguarding donor privacy would require that the identity of donors be unlinked from the biological samples and the codes kept separately, possibly at a public agency. 11 Thus, the tissue bank would provide researchers access to biological material while the identity of the donors is protected.
THE CHALLENGE TO INFORMED CONSENT
The practice of informed consent (and its reverse, informed refusal) is the main vehicle through which the patient is empowered in relation to the health care system. The ethical analysis of risk covers physical and nonphysical harms (psychological, social and economic) resulting from therapeutic interventions or research. 12 At the same time the current implementation (as opposed to analysis) of informed consent often emphasizes the risk of physical harm and it largely assumes that the risk-benefit analysis can be isolated to the consenting individual. 13 Both of these informal, but to date, useful and widely shared features of informed consent are likely to be challenged by pharmacogenomic testing.
First, wide-scale genomic analyses, while posing minimal physical risks, shift the emphasis to vulnerability to non-physical harm. Beyond the obvious risk of loss through dissemination of sensitive information, knowledge of variations of genotype may radically change a person's self-image, potentially leading to a personal loss of sense of well-being and functionality in society. Such information can also affect reproductive and career choices underscoring the importance of understanding the implications of pharmacogenomic testing before actually doing the testing.
Pleiotropy, the ability of one gene to control two or more phenotypic characters, means that unintended information on genetic susceptibility or risk may be uncovered during pharmacogenomic analyses. Work on the gene for the plasma cholesterol transporter apolipoprotein E is a prototypical example of the 'question not asked' dilemma, 14 as research also revealed its relationship to susceptibility to Alzheimer's disease. While the Stanford Program in Genomics, Ethics and Society has recommended not using ApoE as a genetic test for Alzheimer's disease in most people 15, 16 we anticipate that it is only a matter of time before a large number of pleiotropy associations will be revealed and used for diagnostic or predictive testing. Therefore, new policies are needed to address the compartmentalization of pleiotropy information and educate providers how to disclose results of genomic testing. Also, policies must address the subject's right to know in order to assess the benefit-to-risk ratio of genomic testing.
In keeping with the adage 'Informed www.nature.com/tpj consent: it is the substance of the process that matters' (G Annas 8 ), we believe that non-physical harm, and in particular, genetic privacy should be emphasized in the process of informed consent. The current consent process appears inadequate in addressing the privacy of stored DNA material, as revealed by Weir and Horton, who have scored 23 consent documents for long-term storage of DNA samples from potential research participants. In terms of confidentiality and privacy of personal identification the authors assigned scores from one (when adequate description was included of how confidentiality and privacy would be maintained) to four (when neither confidentiality nor privacy were mentioned in the consent document). The mean score for the 23 documents was 3.43 (standard deviation 0.79), and none of the documents received a score of one. 17, 18 More research is also needed on how individuals understand complex genetic risk information 15 and to establish education programs to better prepare the public and health care providers to handle probabilistic information.
Second, genetic testing has ramifications beyond the studied individuals. The privacy of non-consenting persons such as relatives and members of their ethnic (or otherwise defined) community may be threatened by an individual's genetic testing. Family members carry a high risk of having the same SNP profile as the test subject and thus may share the same pharmacogenomic limitations. Family members do not have to provide formal consent, but common practice is to involve them in discussions as assenting adults. 13 Recruiting families also challenges the traditional role of the physician as the patient advocate and the privileged physician-patient relationship, which is central to safeguarding the individual's privacy. These relationships are in danger if the family takes the patient's place in the 'covenant of trust' 19 with the physician.
Genetic testing of an individual bears upon the privacy of individuals who share the same ethnicity with the test subject, as consent from the tested individual may not make the risk of stigmatization acceptable to the group. 20 The specific mechanism to protect a given community in biomedical research must take into account the community's characteristics, such as its cohesiveness, the extent to which it has shared beliefs and resources and the presence or absence of structured representation. 21 Indeed, a distinction should be made between community consent and consultation, as these instruments are each best suited to different types of communities. 13, 21 Others have argued that the socially organized and commonly recognizable groups tend to show mixed lineages that substantially alter their origin stories, and that the true genetic populations (human 'demes') are a priori unidentifiable. 22 Even the population of Iceland, which as a result of its history and geography is more homogeneous than most other European populations, is genetically quite diverse. 23, 24 While we anticipate that population genetics will affect our understanding of ethnically defined human groups, the privacy of the individual will still need protection from violations from group bias, regardless of the novel way in which the group is defined.
For the time being the visible social groups are the subjects of intense research interest. Population isolates are especially appealing, particularly if they have family records reaching back centuries (such as Iceland) or a high prevalence of certain important diseases (such as Tonga). As in each of these examples, competing communitarian and individualistic priorities must be harmonized, and commercial and non-profit approaches should be balanced in keeping with the given community's characteristics 21 including prevalent views of the boundary between self and group, perception of property and legal tradition. 25 In view of their specific historic experience, communities may experience fear of discrimination and exploitation. These may prove to be a strong disincentive to join studies, unless adequate education, community participation in decision-making and mechanisms to share to benefits of research (such as royalties from patented applications) are provided.
Children, fetuses and embryos constitute special cases of non-consenting subjects. Policies should be developed to address a minor's competence to consent, and to handle disagreements between parents regarding consent to testing. Given that samples obtained from children (even with the consent of their parents) may be used in risk profiling of future adults, even before they themselves can participate in riskbenefit analyses, such policies should delineate the rules of storage of and access to genetic information from children.
DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYERS AND INSURERS
Employers are pressured to reduce overhead and protect against future liability costs, and some may decide to test consenting employees for patterns of sensitivity to work-related pollutants or to ensure that employees are optimally matched to tasks. 13 Such attempts are obviously not new. What is unprecedented is the magnitude of collected information, the data that digresses from the original question, and an opportunity to sell the subjects' genetic information. At the same time, insurance companies need to protect against fraud and financial instability. 13, 26, 27 This need must be balanced by the public's interest to prevent discrimination and stigmatization and the research community's need to advance discovery. Clearly, anti-discriminatory and privacy legislation are needed to safeguard individual privacy while balancing these competing and legitimate interests. A second intervention to limit the potential for abuse with pharmacogenomic testing is to limit the advertising and marketing of such tests as has been done with prescription drugs.
'ORPHAN PATIENTS'
Pharmacogenetics will generate both 'orphan drugs', defined as pharmaceuticals with a restricted market, as well as 'orphan patients', a probably heterogeneous group of individuals who fall outside of the major patterns of drug response. Being labeled 'orphan'
The Pharmacogenomics Journal or 'non-responder', 28 'less profitable to treat' or 'more expensive to treat' 27, 29 may affect the patient's future care, insurability and even employment. Anti-discriminatory legislation coupled with patent or other incentives may be required to foster the development of drugs suited to this population. While the incentives may assume different forms in accordance with the regulatory culture of the specific country, they should strive to ensure that such individuals share the dividend of pharmacogenomics.
CONCLUSION
While promising to revolutionize the drug prescription process, pharmacogenomics will also challenge our goal to protect privacy. Not all such concerns and risks are unique to pharmacogenomics, 4 as violations of privacy and discrimination against vulnerable individuals or groups have ample historic precedent. Yet these risks assume an utterly new form in the emerging era of wide-scale genomic scans by virtue of their comprehensive description of our genetic makeup. A breach of privacy at that level may threaten the foundations of our family and ethnic bonds and our sense of self and role in society. In addition, the probabilistic depiction of our future would likely affect our ability to obtain health and life insurance.
Beyond issues of technical feasibility, the success of personalized medicine will thus largely depend upon societal acceptance of the riskbenefit trade-off involved in pharmacogenomic testing. Pharmacogenomics is morally neutral and its ethically viable implementation will require a broad and ongoing dialog between academics, industry, community representatives and regulatory agencies. Education of the public, health care providers and policy makers to prevent misunderstanding and fear is long overdue. Protecting the individual from abuse without stifling entrepreneurship and academic research is a daunting, yet achievable goal. A broad involvement of the public, accomplished through, but not limited at legislation that protects genetic privacy and prevents discrimination is essential for continued societal support upon which future research rests.
